Godel's Proof

In 1931 Kurt G?del published his fundamental paper, "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems." This revolutionary paper challenged certain basic assumptions underlying much research in mathematics and logic. G?del received public recognition of his work in 1951 when he was awarded the first Albert Einstein Award for achievement in the natural sciences—perhaps the highest award of its kind in the United States. The award committee described his work in mathematical logic as "one of the greatest contributions to the sciences in recent times."

However, few mathematicians of the time were equipped to understand the young scholar's complex proof. Ernest Nagel and James Newman provide a readable and accessible explanation to both scholars and non-specialists of the main ideas and broad implications of G?del's discovery. It offers every educated person with a taste for logic and philosophy the chance to understand a previously difficult and inaccessible subject.

New York University Press is proud to publish this special edition of one of its bestselling books. With a new introduction by Douglas R. Hofstadter, this book will appeal students, scholars, and professionals in the fields of mathematics, computer science, logic and philosophy, and science.

G?del's incompleteness theorem--which showed that any robust mathematical system contains statements that are true yet unprovable within the system--is an anomaly in 20th-century mathematics. Its conclusions are as strange as they are profound, but, unlike other recent theorems of comparable importance, grasping the main steps of the proof requires little more than high school algebra and a bit of patience. Ernest Nagel and James Newman's original text was one of the first (and best) to bring G?del's ideas to a mass audience. With brevity and clarity, the volume described the historical context that made G?del's theorem so paradigm-shattering. Where the first edition fell down, however, was in the guts of the proof itself; the brevity that served so well in defining the problem made their rendering of G?del's solution so dense as to be nearly indigestible.

This reissuance of Nagel and Newman's classic has been vastly improved by the deft editing of Douglas Hofstadter, a protégé of Nagel's and himself a popularizer of G?del's work. In the second edition, Hofstadter reworks significant sections of the book, clarifying and correcting here, adding necessary detail there. In the few instances in which his writing diverges from the spirit of the original, it is to emphasize the interplay between formal mathematical deduction and meta-mathematical reasoning--a subject explored in greater depth in Hofstadter's other delightful writings. --Clark Williams-Derry